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counter the known danger can be made. If it appears to the court that
these three elements are present, it can be concluded that the plaintiff
has assumed the risk as a matter of law and cannot recover from the
negligent defendant. 39
EDGAR H.

MACKINLAY

PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY BY THE PROSECUTION
IN A CRIMINAL CASE
There have been significant developments in recent years in discovery by the accused in criminal cases,1 with California the leader in
allowing the accused liberal pre-trial discovery of evidence in the
hands of the prosecution. 2 In the recent case of Jones v. Superior
Court,3 the Supreme Court of California took a revolutionary step

and allowed the prosecution limited discovery rights against the
accused. On the day set for trial of a rape case, the accused moved
for a continuance on the ground that he was and for a long time had
been impotent, and needed time to gather evidence to establish this
as a fact. The motion was granted. A few days later, the district attorney filed a motion for discovery asking that the petitioner be required to furnish the prosecution with the names and addresses of
all physicians who had treated petitioner prior to trial; all physicians
who would be subpoenaed to testify on behalf of petitioner; all reports of physicians pertaining to the physical condition of petitioner;
and all x-rays of petitioner. The trial court granted tlhe state's motion.
The defendant sought a writ of prohibition to stop enforcement of
the trial court's order.
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's granting of this motion,
"'[P]rerequisites for the application of the defense of assumption of risk ...
are that the assumption must be free and voluntary; that the risk is not assumed
where the conduct of the defendant has left the plaintiff no reasonable alternative;
and that, if a plaintiff with full knowledge of the dangerous condition of a sidewalk,
because of icy conditions, voluntarily attempts to walk on it, he is not deemed to
assume the risk of injury unless the defendant proves the reasonable availability
of a safer route of travel." Donald v. Moses, 254 Minn. 186, 192, 94 N.W.2d 255,
26o (1959).
'For a discussion of the historical background and present status of pre-trial
discovery in favor of the defendant, see Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 Stan. L Rev. 293 (ig6o).
2See Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 Calif. L.
Rev. 56, 59 (g6i).
322 Cal. Rptr. 879, 732 P.2d 919 (1962).
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except insofar as it related to medical reports found to be protected by
the attorney-client privilege. The court said that since the purpose of
discovery in favor of the accused is to ascertain the facts, "absent the
privilege against self-incrimination or other privileges provided by
law, the defendant in a criminal case has no valid interest in denying
the prosecution access to evidence that can throw light on the issues of
the case." 4 In concluding that there was no violation of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, the court relied on the
"alibi" statutes in effect in a number of states. 5 These statutes require
a defendant in a criminal case to give notice to the prosecution, prior
to trial, of his intention to rely on an alibi as a defense, and to give
information regarding the place where the defendant claims to have
been when the crime was committed and the names of witnesses on
whose testimony he will rely.6 Such statutes have been upheld as not
7
violating the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.
A dissenting opinion in Jones8 pointed out that it is difficult to
determine how far-reaching the decision is since it was only through
the defendant's motion for a continuance that the prosecution learned
of the defense of impotency. It seems unlikely that discovery in favor
of the prosecution will be limited to the rare instances in which the
defendant for some reason discloses prior to trial that he intends to
rely on an affirmative defense. Consequently, the dissenting judge

thought the majority was recognizing pre-trial discovery by the prosecution as to any affrmative defense 9
'372 P.2d at 920.

61d. at

922.

'The Ohio and New York statutes are typical. Ohio Rev. Code, tit. 29, § 2945.58

(1958) provides: "Whatever a defendant in a criminal cause proposes to offer in his
defense, testimony to establish an alibi on his behalf, such defendant shall, not
less than three days before the trial of such cause, file and serve upon the prosecuting attorney, a notice in writing of his intention to claim such alibi. Notice shall
include specific information as to the place at which the accused claims to have
been at the time of the alleged offense. If the defendant fails to file such written
notice, the court may exclude evidence offered by the defendant for the purpose of
proving such an alibi. N.Y. Crim. Code § 95(1) provides: [I]f such defendant intend to
offer... testimony which may tend to establish his presence elsewhere than at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he must ... file a bill of particulars which shall set forth in detail the place or places where the defendant

claims to have been, together with the names, post-office addresses, residences, and
places of employment of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely ....
Unless
the defendant shall ...
file such bill of particulars, the court ...may exclude such
testimony ......
7
State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. i, 176 N.E. 656 (1931); People v. Shade, 161
Misc. 212, 292 N.Y.S. 612 (Queens County Ct. 1936).
'372 P.2d at 927.
$Ibid.
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The constitutionality of the decision of the court may be seriously
questioned. As noted, the majority of the court relied on the alibi
statutes to sustain the constitutionality of the decision. However, such
statutes, and the philosophy used by the courts to find them constitutional, do not seem to give support to the decision of the court. The
statutes have for their purpose the informing, through pre-trial notice,
of the prosecution of the nature of the defense defendant intends to
rely on. They are limited in scope, being applicable only where the
defense involved is in the nature of an alibi,10 or sometimes insanity." The statutes do not involve the production of documentary
evidence, and thus are more of a pleading device than a discovery
method. The sanction for noncompliance with the statutory requirements is to preclude the defendant from introducing any testimony
of alibi witnesses.' 2 In upholding the constitutionality of an alibi
statute, a lower New York court in People v. Shade13 said:
"Certain it is that there is nothing about the section which
compels the defendant to incriminate himself, nor is there
anything which compels him to give any information to the
district attorney unless he voluntarily and for his own benefit
intends to use an alibi defense. He is the sole judge of what he
is going to do and he is not compelled in any sense to be a
witness against himself but merely to give certain information
to
4
the district attorney if he intends to submit an alibi.'
In Jones, the court is permitting pre-trial discovery, upon motion
by the prosecution, of documents and other evidence the accused intends to rely on in proving his defense. The sanction for noncompliance by the defendant would be contempt of court, not exclusion
of the defendant's evidence. Therefore, the court gets little support
for its decision from the alibi statutes. It would seem that the holding in Jones could be upheld only on the ground that the privilege against self-incrimination is not applicable to pre-existing documents.
The privilege against self-incrimination has been subject to much
controversy and debate throughout its history in American juris"See, e.g., statutes note 6 supra; see also 6 Wigmore, Evidence § x85 5 (b) n.2
(3d ed. 1940).
"See 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1855 (b) n.2 (3d ed. 194o).
"See statutes note 6 supra; see also People v. Longaria, 333 Mich 696, 53 N.W.2d
685 (1952); State v. Nooks, 123 Ohio St. 19o, 174 N.E. 743 (1930).
's161 Misc. 212, 292 N.Y.S. 612 (Queens County Ct. 1936).
uId. at 615-616.
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prudence. Calls for its abolition have been made, 15 and friends of the
privilege have difficulty in presenting policy reasons of sufficient importance to justify the privilege. 16 Champions of individual liberty
have scoffed at the importance of the privilege. 17 In cases which "may
be read as a reflection of the Court's lack of enthusiasm for the policy
underlying the privilege,"' 8 the United States Supreme Court has
held that the fourteenth amendment does not make the fifth amendment privilege, against self-incrimination applicable to the states; 19
nor can a witness in a federal proceeding claim the privilege on the
ground he would be incriminated under state law.2 0 Further, where
documentary evidence was involved, the Court has held that corporations are not protected by the privilege; 21 nor may corporate officers
withhold books on the ground they would be incriminated thereby. 22
Even unincorporated associations may not be protected by the privilege.23 Nor is the privilege applicable to records kept pursuant to
certain regulatory statutes. 24 It can be argued with some force that
the privilege should not apply to pre-existing documents at all.2 5 If the

privilege should logically be limited to testimonial compulsion, dis3Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J.
Crim. L,C. & P.S. 1014 (1934); Terry, Constitutional Provisions Against Forcing SelfIncrimination, 15 Yale L.J. 127 (19o6); Carman, Plea for the Withdrawal of Constitutional Privilege for the Criminal, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 2oo (1938).
"See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2251 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (review of the
various policy arguments put forth in support of the privilege, and concluding that
the policy of the privilege is anything but dear); see also McCormick, Evidence §
75, at 156 (1954) ("Such policy as modern writers are able to discover as a basis for
the self-incrimination privilege.., is feeble and inadequate at best...").
"See the famous statement by Justice Cardozo, in Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937): "This [privilege against self-incrimination] too might be
lost, and justice still be done. Indeed, today as in the past there are students of our
penal system who look upon the immunity as a mischief rather than a benefit, and
who would limit its scope; or destroy it altogether. No doubt there would remain
the need to give protection against torture, physical or mental ....
Justice, however, would not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly
inquiry."
sMeltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act. and the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 687, 688 (1951).
"Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
2'United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
2'Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361 (1911).
=Ibid.
"United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
21Shapiro v. United States, 335 US. 1 (1948) (records required to be. kept by
licensee under Emergency Price Control Act held not privileged).
"See Meltzer, supra note x8, at 7o1, where the author concludes that the application of the privilege to pre-existing documents is probably a result of an
"unwillingness to command the impossible."
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covery could be developed as fully in criminal cases as it has been
in civil cases. Nevertheless, despite the inroads on the privilege where
documentary evidence is involved, it is well established that the privilege generally extends to compulsory production of pre-existing documents.

26

Despite the doubt of the constitutionality of Jones, the basic premise
of the court is sound. It would seem that the objective of liberal pretrial discovery in civil cases is equally desirable in criminal cases.
There would seem to be no valid reason to deny discovery to the
prosecution, if such discovery could be accomplished within the
permissible bounds of the privilege against self-incrimination. This is
particularly true where, as in California, liberal discovery rights have
been granted to the defendant. Possibilities of waiver of the privilege
may present an answer. It has been suggested by Professor Louisell
that the defendant be required, as a condition of a discovery order
in his favor, to waive his privilege against self-incrimination as to
evidence in his hands, which is of approximately equal probative
value to that sought.2 7 He finds support for this doctrine in Mcain v.
Superior Court.28 The defendant moved against the prosecution for
pre-trial discovery of certain documents in the hands of the prosecution. The prosecution then moved for discovery requesting, as a condition to granting defendant's motion, that defendant be ordered to
produce all statements of witnesses and any documents or photographs
expected to be used as evidence at the trial. At a hearing, the defendant told the trial court that he had no objection to the production of
the documents, and the court granted both motions 'on a "reciprocal
contemporaneous basis." On appeal, the California court held that the
defendant, by voluntarily consenting to discovery, waived his privi29
lege against self-incrimination.
In conclusion, with modern development of liberal discovery rights
in favor of the accused, it might be expected that there will be an effort
on the part of courts toward some development of discovery in favor of
the prosecution. Jones seems to be such an effort.
ANDREW J. RUSSELL

"See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2264 (3d ed. 194o).
2.Louisell, supra note 2, at go.
2s84 Cal. App. 813, 7 Cal. Rptr. 841 (Dist. Ct. App. 196o).
'47 Cal. Rptr. at 843.

